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NOTE
CYBERATTACKS AND THE COVERT ACTION STATUTE:
TOWARD A DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
OFFENSIVE CYBEROPERATIONS
Aaron P. Brecher*
Cyberattacks are capable of penetrating and disabling vital national infra-
structure, causing catastrophic economic harms, and approximating the
effects of war, allfrom remote locations and without the use of convention-
al weapons. They can be nearly impossible to attribute definitively to their
sources and require relatively few resources to launch. The United States is
vulnerable to cyberattacks but also uniquely capable of carrying out
cyberattacks of its own. To do so effectively, the United States requires a
legal regime that is well suited to cyberattacks' unique attributes and that
preserves executive discretion while inducing the executive branch to co-
ordinate with Congress. The trouble is that it is unclear which domestic
legal framework should govern these attacks. The military and intelligence
communities have disputed which of their respective legal regimes should
control. The choice between these frameworks raises important issues
about the policy benefits of the executive branch keeping Congress in-
formed regarding cyberattacks that it conducts. It also raises constitutional
questions about the branches' respective roles in warmaking when the cho-
sen course of conduct blurs the line between an intelligence operation and
an act of war. This Note argues that, in the absence of an independent con-
gressional authorization to use force against a target, the covert action
statute, which demands written reports from the president to the congres-
sional intelligence committees in advance of operations, should
presumptively govern, and that the president should issue an executive or-
der to that effect.
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INTRODUCTION
In the second half of 2009, a serious computer virus began working its
way through Iranian computer systems, eventually reaching the Natanz nu-
clear enrichment facility, where it damaged many hundreds of centrifuges
used to produce enriched uranium.' The virus, known as Stuxnet, was de-
signed to target specific industrial control processes and appears to have
been aimed specifically at the Natanz enrichment facility.2 The damage from
Stuxnet was so extensive that the facility had to be shut down briefly.3
Though the source of Stuxnet is not known definitively, press reports sug-
gest that the United States created the virus with assistance from Israel.4
The Stuxnet incident highlights the increasing importance of cybersecu-
rity as a key aspect of national security. It shows that sophisticated software
that is difficult to attribute definitively to its source can cause tangible dam-
age beyond cyberspace-potentially enough damage to be considered an act
of war. U.S. policymakers have considered the possible courses of action
that could be adopted in a cyberwar, and in 2011, the Pentagon announced
that it might respond to certain cyberattacks on critical U.S. infrastructure
with counterstrikes using conventional weapons.' Much of the public debate
1. Joby Warrick, Iran's Natanz Nuclear Facility Recovered Quickly from Stuxnet
Cyberattack, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2011, at AO1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 2012, at Al (describing Stuxnet as part of a larger campaign of cyberat-
tacks against Iran carried out by U.S. intelligence and military officials, with aid from Israeli
officials).
5. Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST. J., May
31, 2011, atA1.
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on cybersecurity has focused on how to prevent cyberattacks. 6 This Note
analyzes the domestic legal regime that should govern the use of cyberat-
tacks by the United States, especially outside the context of an otherwise
traditional conflict.
The term "cyberattack," as used in this Note, refers to a "deliberate ac-
tion[] to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or
networks or the information [or] programs resident in or transiting these
systems or networks." '7 Key characteristics of cyberattacks include the great
difficulty of attributing them definitively to their sources,8 and their potential
to cause almost instantaneous effects from anywhere in the world.9 Cyberat-
tacks are frequently confused with cyberexploitation, which as a technical
matter is similar. The key difference is that cyberexploitation involves only
the monitoring or copying of data, while cyberattacks involve the manipula-
tion of data. l0 This Note discusses only the latter.
One lens through which to evaluate the proper domestic legal framework
for cyberattacks is whether such operations should rely on intelligence
legal authority (called "title 50" authority) or military legal authority
(called "title 10" authority). I I Under the military framework, the president
is often free to order a wide range of operations without giving advance
6. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARD-
ING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 10 (William A. Owens et al.
eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]. The National Research Council ("NRC") Report con-
tains the most valuable general discussion that I have seen of all aspects of cyberattack,
including the legal implications of its use by the United States.
7. Id. at 1.
8. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 96 (2008) ("There is still no technolo-
gy for determining the source of a disguised cyberattack ... "); Jack Goldsmith, The New
Vulnerability, NEw REPUBLIC, June 24, 2010, at 21, 23 (reviewing RICHARD A. CLARKE &
ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR (2010)).
9. Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 23.
10. NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-2; Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 22. A few examples
may help illustrate this distinction. A cyberoperation that infiltrates the network of a country's
foreign ministry and copies communications to and from embassy personnel would be a
cyberexploitation. An infiltration that disrupts the network at a foreign weapons manufacturing
facility would be a cyberattack. Such martial effects need not be present in a cyberattack,
however. Manipulating data on electronic ballots in order to alter the results of a foreign elec-
tion would also be a cyberattack, as would manipulating an email server into listing false
senders for the communications that it displays.
11. The debate over whether the military's or the intelligence community's legal re-
gimes should govern particular actions is frequently invoked in national security discussions.
See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 1O/Iitle
50 Debate, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & PoL'Y 539 (2012) [hereinafter Chesney, Military-
Intelligence Convergence]; Jeffrey H. Smith, Symposium, State Intelligence Gathering and
International Law-Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 546-47 (2007) (arguing that
executive branch lawyers often debate the question of which framework governs certain activi-
ties). This Note refers to "title 10" authorities as shorthand for military authorities because that
is the language employed in much of the academic literature. However, some of the more
important limitations on U.S. military authority are codified outside of title 10 of the United
States Code. See, e.g., Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006); War Crimes Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441; War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006).
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notice to Congress. 12 However, under the intelligence regime, covert ac-
tions, which are "activities ... to influence political, economic, or military
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the [U.S. govern-
ment] will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly,"'13 require written
findings by the president that the operation is important to U.S. national se-
curity and reports made to the congressional intelligence committees.
14
Many cyberattacks could conceivably be carried out under either military
legal authority or intelligence legal authority. However, the choice of a pre-
sumptive legal regime for national security policies could have an important
effect on strategy, 5 as well as profound implications for the accountability
of the executive branch to Congress.
16
Engaging with the issues surrounding cyberattacks is important in part
because American dependence on networked communications in both the
private and public spheres makes the United States extremely vulnerable to
cyberattacks.17 At the same time, the United States is also among the best-
equipped countries in the world to carry out offensive cyberattacks of its
own.' s Having the proper legal framework to regulate America's offensive
use of these powerful tools will prove increasingly important as cyberattacks
emerge as attractive options for dealing with cyberthreats (and physical
threats) posed by terrorist groups as well as dealing with individuals who
have the ability to use this relatively inexpensive cyberattack system.' 9
This Note argues that the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991's definitions and regulations of covert action 20 (hereinafter the "covert
action statute") should provide the presumptive legal framework for cyberat-
tacks initiated by the U.S. government, especially when the operation may
12. Smith, supra note 11, at 546.
13. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
14. Id. § 413b(a)-(d). For more detail on the reporting requirements, see infra Section
I.A.1.
15. See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 5-10 (2002); Matthew C. Waxman,
Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L.
421, 424-25 (2011). Probably the most sophisticated elaboration of the deep relationship
between law and strategy is Professor Bobbitt's. See generally BOBBITT, supra.
16. See generally infra Part m.
17. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 8, at xiii ("[Clyber war places [the United
States] at greater jeopardy than it does any other nation."); Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 24
(noting that over 90 percent of U.S. military and intelligence communications travel over
privately owned telecommunications networks); see also BOBBITT, supra note 8, at 234 (call-
ing a cyberattack on the U.S. financial infrastructure an event that could threaten the
consensual basis of the American government's rule).
18. Jack Goldsmith, Op-Ed., Can We Stop the Global Cyber Arms Race?, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 2010, at A17.
19. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 273-77, on the danger posed by nonstate actors.
See also Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks to Weaken Libya,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at Al, for a suggestion that uncertainty over the legal implications
of cyberattacks contributed to a decision not to employ them in the Libya conflict.
20. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, tit. VI, sec.
602(a)(2), § 503, 105 Stat. 429, 442-44 (1991) (codifed at 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006)).
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affect neutral parties or the target is not already the object of a congressional
authorization to use force. Part I summarizes the competing intelligence and
military legal regimes. It then argues that cyberattacks pose unique problems
when carried out under the military framework because of the difficulty of
attributing a cyberattack to its source and the possibility of an attack produc-
ing serious effects on persons and infrastructure in allied countries. It
concludes that the intelligence (covert action) regime can properly govern a
wider range of actions than the military regime. Part II contends that, for
cyberattacks with warlike effects, the covert action statute might serve as an
alternative domestic legal basis to a traditional authorization to use force.
Part II also argues that there are constitutional advantages to executive-
legislative coordination when it is uncertain whether an attack amounts to a
use of force-the alternative source of statutory support strengthens the
president's authority to act in ambiguous circumstances. Finally, Part III
concludes that the covert action statute provides the best balance between
executive independence and congressional oversight among the two existing
legal frameworks. It advocates that the president issue an executive order
making the covert action regime the presumptive procedure for conducting
cyberattacks.
I. THE COVERT ACTION AND MILITARY REGIMES EXPLORED
It is first useful to delineate the detailed statutory requirements for carry-
ing out covert actions, as well as the circumstances under which the military
may engage incyberattacks. To that end, Section L.A briefly summarizes the
covert action and military regime procedures. Section I.B then argues that
the unique features of cyberspace make applying the law of armed conflict
very difficult. Specifically, uncertainty over which cyberattacks constitute a
use of force under international law could hamper the military's legal ability
to launch cyberattacks under the military authority regime. Section I.C ar-
gues that while the covert action framework is not a catchall for every
cyberattack that the government may wish to initiate, it does provide a legal
basis for a considerable range of offensive actions in cyberspace. Examining
the definition of covert action and an important exception to this definition,
Section I.C shows that the covert action framework can be used by any
number of agencies operating under a single framework, and it adapts well
to the increasing blending of military and intelligence functions in the
American national security apparatus.
A. Comparing the Covert Action and Military Regimes
Both military and intelligence activities are subject to complex internal
planning and approval procedures. The most relevant difference between the
respective legal regimes for purposes of this Note is that covert actions re-
quire the president to submit written "findings" to Congress whereas
"execute orders" lack similarly rigorous reporting requirements. A "finding"
is a written report authorizing a covert action that the president must submit
December 2012]
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to the relevant congressional committees in advance of the operation. 21 An
"execute order" is the analogous source of authority for military operations,
and can be issued by the president or other high-ranking military officials.
22
1. The Covert Action Regime: Written Findings and Advance
Reports to Congressional Intelligence Committees
The covert action statute establishes a norm of submitting ex ante writ-
ten reports to congressional intelligence committees that describe an
impending operation, as well as the national security interest that it will
serve. The statute dates back to 199123 and was first enacted in response to
the Iran-Contra affair.24 A covert action is an activity designed to influence
conditions abroad in situations where the U.S. role is not meant to be pub-
licly acknowledged.25 Importantly, the definition of covert action excludes,
among other things, "traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine
support to such activities. '26 It follows from this exclusion that even activi-
ties meant to be unacknowledged or potentially unacknowledged are not
covert actions if they are traditional military activities.
Before initiating a covert action, the president must make a written find-
ing that the action supports an identifiable foreign policy objective and is
important to national security.27 The finding must also specify each U.S.
government "department, agency, or entity ... authorized to fund or other-
wise participate in any significant way" in the action.28 "A finding may not
authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any stat-
ute . ... "I29
Normally, the finding must be submitted to the members of the congres-
sional intelligence committees soon after the decision is made and before
the action is initiated.30 When the need for secrecy is very great, however,
the president has the option of initially submitting the finding only to the
Speaker and minority leader of the House, the majority and minority leaders
of the Senate, and the chairmen and ranking members of the two intelli-
gence committees. 31 If neither of these reporting procedures is followed, the
21. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2006).
22. See Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence, supra note 11, at 574.
23. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, tit. VI, sec.
602(a)(2), § 503, 105 Stat. 429, 442-44 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006)).
24. JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE 150 (2007).
25. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
26. Id. § 413b(e)(2).
27. Id. § 413b(a). Where urgency does not permit an advance finding, a written record
of the president's decision must be contemporaneously made and reduced to a written finding
no more than forty-eight hours after the decision is made. Id. § 413b(a)(1).
28. Id. § 413b(a)(3).
29. Id. § 413b(a)(5).
30. Id. § 413b(c).
31. Id. § 413b(c)(2).
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president must make a timely report to the committees, as well as give rea-
sons for the delay.
32
2. The Military Regime: Execute Orders and Limited
Congressional Notification
Unlike covert actions, military operations do not require written find-
ings. Instead, "execute orders" are the source of authority for initiating such
actions. 33 These orders may state an obligation to seek approval from certain
officials, even the president or secretary of defense, to conduct certain types
of operations. 34 In addition, an execute order, unlike a finding, can function
as an ex ante authorization to act if particular circumstances arise.3 Thus,
the orders can, but need not, substantially replicate an internal process simi-
lar to that for covert action.
36
As for reporting to Congress, the president has an obligation under the
War Powers Resolution to make a written report to the entire Congress with-
in forty-eight hours of introducing U.S. military forces into active
hostilities. 37 Notably, though, the Obama Administration has taken an ex-
tremely narrow view of what constitutes "hostilities," so that many military
activities will likely not be reported under the War Powers Resolution.
38
While there are other statutes in place that require reports of certain military
activities to the congressional armed services committees, there is nothing
analogous to the covert action requirements, and many activities are exempt
from any reporting requirements.3 9
In the case of cyberattacks in particular, a recently enacted statute seems
to require additional procedures. The National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, an annual appropriations bill that funds and governs
the military, provides that the military may conduct offensive operations in
32. Id. § 413b(c)(3).
33. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence, supra note 11, at 574.
34. Id. at 605.
35. See id. at 606.
36. See id. at 605.
37. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
38. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence, supra note 11, at 612. Specifically, the
Obama Administration has claimed that the strikes in Libya in summer 2011 did not amount
to "hostilities" based on factors including the limited nature of the mission, the "minimal direct
exposure of U.S. armed forces to harm, the limited potential for escalation, and the limited
military means used. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 112th Cong. 12-17 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department
of State). Applying these factors to cyberattacks, which do not require forces on the ground, it
is difficult to conceive of a cyberattack that would trigger the provisions of the War Powers Reso-
lution. See Robert Chesney, Offensive Cyberspace Operations, the NDAA, and the itle lO-itle
50 Debate, LAWFARE (Dec. 14, 2011, 10:17 PM) [hereinafter Chesney, Offensive Cyberspace
Operations], http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/cyberoperafions/.
39. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence, supra note 11, at 612-13.
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cyberspace, subject to presidential approval.41 It does not appear that presi-
dential approval is required for other cyberoperations that are not
cyberattacks, such as cyberexploitations. Moreover, it is unclear whether the
presidential-approval requirement means that each specific cyberattack must
be approved, as is the case with covert action, or whether there can be an
advance presidential authorization to conduct a cyberattack under certain
conditions, like with other execute orders.
B. The Military and Cyberattacks: An Uncomfortable Fit
This Section argues that the legal regime generally governing military
action is not always well suited to governing cyberattacks. Cyberattacks'
key attributes-remote access, unpredictable effects, and difficulty of attrib-
ution--can result in fundamentally different legal problems than
conventional weapons attacks. This is because many cyberattacks bear no
similarity to military attacks at all. Those that arguably constitute a use of
force under international law are even more problematic.
A military's essential purpose is national defense. When many think of
military operations, they first imagine kinetic strikes: the use of bombs,
guns, and other conventional weapons. The emergence of the cyberattack as
a viable tool of warfare enables a military with sufficient technological ca-
pacity to disable an enemy's communication network, issue false orders, and
even impair critical infrastructure, such as by shutting down a power grid,
all without firing a shot or even entering the enemy's territory.41 Although
the United States has taken advantage of earlier advances in technology for
strategic gain 42 without sustained confusion over the law that governs the
use of those tools, activity in the digital world cannot always be neatly anal-
ogized to activity in the physical world.
Given that the term cyberattack denotes any action to alter, degrade, or
destroy data on computer programs or networks,4 3 it should be obvious that
many cyberattacks bear no resemblance to warlike actions in their effects.
For example, almost no one would label an attack that temporarily shuts
down service on a private commercial website an act of war. In situations in
which the United States has a legitimate national security interest in carry-
ing out such an attack, it is unlikely that the military would play a helpful
40. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011) (codified as note to 10 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. V 2011)).
41. See Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'y 63, 69-70 (2010).
42. Many commentators have analyzed the strategic impact of technological advances
in the United States. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 293-96 (analogizing cyberoperations
to the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy); Andrew E Krepinevich, Cavalry
to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions, NAT'L INT., Fall 1994, at 30; see also MAX
BOOT, WAR MADE NEw 268-436 (2006).
43. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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role." The more difficult analytical issues arise when the physical effects of
a cyberattack are substantially similar to those of an armed attack under the
terms of article 51 of the United Nations ("UN") Charter, which recognizes
an inherent right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack on a UN
member state.
45
One test to determine whether cyberattacks constitute an armed attack or
use of force depends on whether the real-world effects of the operations are
equivalent to those of a traditional physical attack,46 but this effects-based
approach can be difficult to apply.47 Once one shifts to the digital realm,
with its features of remote access and relative anonymity, analogizing activi-
ties to those that take place in the physical world can be a frustrating
exercise. One prominent analogy discussed in the cyberattack literature is
the distinction between economic sanctions and a blockade.48 Economic
sanctions are not a use of force under international law.49 But a blockade,
which may have the same effect, is.5" Unlike sanctions, a blockade involves
physically stopping or threatening to physically stop shipments. Applying
this analogy to cyberattacks, the debate centers on what type of economic
impact might justify either a warlike cyberattack in response or an attack in
the physical world. For example, it is unclear whether an attack that manipu-
lates data on a stock exchange, causing a devastating economic impact,
constitutes a use of force.5' Similarly, is a cyberattack that targets a specific
industry, in a similar manner to illegal blockades and legal sanctions, a use
of force?
52
44. This is not necessarily true if the skills to conduct such an attack are the same as
those required for cyberwar. Still, such an attack seems to be outside the scope of the mili-
tary's mission, unless the operation were in support of a larger military conflict.
45. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations... "). Importantly, the universe of "armed attacks" is narrower than that of a
"use of force," also prohibited under international law. Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of
Cyber-Attack, 100 CAUF. L. REv. 817, 844 (2012). Thus, it is possible for acts to violate pro-
hibitions on the use of force but not trigger a right of self-defense under international law. Id.
This means that a use of force in response to a cyberattack that arguably was a use of force but
did not meet the test for an armed attack may violate a state's international legal obligations.
46. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 33-34. The NRC Report is one of many anal-
yses that have considered this issue to adopt such an approach. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE,
supra note 8, at 178; Waxman, supra note 15, at 431-32; Matthew Hoisington, Comment,
Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self-Defense, 32 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 439, 447-49 (2009).
47. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 41, at 73; Hoisington, supra note 46, at 452.
48. This complexity is discussed in NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 257-59, and Lin,
supra note 41, at 80-82.
49. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 257; Lin, supra note 41, at 80.
50. See supra note 49.
51. See Lin, supra note 41, at 74, 80-82. Dr. Lin argues that a sustained attack that shut
down stock trading would almost certainly be considered a use of force, even absent physical
destruction, but notes that there is an open question when it comes to mere manipulation of
information and a resulting loss of public confidence. Id. at 74.
52. Lin makes this same distinction. See id. at 81-82.
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If the issue is whether the military can carry out cyberattacks as a gen-
eral matter, these line-drawing difficulties are far from merely academic; the
United States might wish to carry out a cyberattack without triggering a
right for the target to respond with traditional force under international law.
Alternatively, the United States may choose to respond to a cyberattack with
one of its own. If the initial attack is not an armed attack but the response is
a use of force,53 the American attack could create profound diplomatic and
security troubles for the United States. Whichever legal regime is chosen, it
should give a policymaker pause to think that a cyberattack, if undertaken
by military authorities, could be done with significantly less congressional
oversight than a covert action would require.5 4 This in turn means less op-
portunity for persons outside the executive branch to weigh in on the
wisdom of the proposed action.
The difficulties only increase when the question of whom to target aris-
es. Not only are cyberattacks extremely difficult to trace definitively to their
origins, but the wide availability of information technology and the ability to
operate from virtually anywhere means that the target (or perpetrator) of a
cyberattack could be a state or more problematically, a terrorist organiza-
tion, criminal group, or an individual.55 Obviously, these nonstate actors can
all operate within the territory of a state. The attribution difficulty means
that nonstate actors may be able to operate on a digital plane without detec-
tion by either the state in which they operate or a state (like the United
States) that wishes to target them.
Two important consequences flow from the attribution difficulty in a
scenario where the United States carries out a cyberattack in response to a
cyberattack by a nonstate actor. First, the United States may be attacking the
wrong people. Almost as importantly, even if the original attack can be de-
finitively traced to its source, the state from which the group operated may
have nothing to do with the conflict.56 For example, suppose the United
States sustained a cyberattack on its critical infrastructure and wished to
53. Such a scenario is more than plausible given that the indirect effects of cyberattacks
are often more harmful than the direct effects, and more importantly, are extremely difficult
for the cyberattacker to predict or control. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 30-31, 80-81,
113-14. For the distinction between "armed attack" and "use of force' see supra note 45.
54. See Smith, supra note 11, at 546-47.
55. NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 81, 138-41, 273-79; Goldsmith, supra note 8. Of
course, one could easily argue that the difficulty of applying the law of war outside the context
of the state system is endemic in modern conflict, but the features of cyberwarfare certainly
exacerbate the issue.
56. This is little different from the case with kinetic warfare and the problems of terror-
ist groups operating within states that do not support them. Cyberattacks, however, have the
(un)fortunate combination of seeming invisible in some ways, see Goldsmith, supra note 8
(arguing that the American public is largely ignorant of the threat of cyberattack and cyberex-
ploitation because of their general isolation from computer networks and difficulty perceiving
the threat), yet having the potential to cause effects every bit as devastating as kinetic strikes.
This might have the troubling tendency of encouraging the use of cyberattacks in the mistaken
belief that they are an easy alternative to traditional force. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at
50.
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respond with its own cyberattack, only to discover that the attack originated
from a small group of terrorists using computers in an allied country (and
that the attack probably passed through computer networks in many allies'
territories).57 If a responsive cyberattack were to affect, for example, access
to the internet in those allied countries,58 the attack may be inappropriate or,
in extreme circumstances, may be best done covertly, which would allow the
United States to disavow its actions.
59
C. The Covert Action Regime: Some Advantages and a Limitation
This Section explains that the covert action framework provides a source
of authority for a broader range of cyberattacks than military authorities do,
and addresses the advantages of the covert action framework over those of
the military regime, as well as an important limitation on covert action. This
Section first discusses the advantages of the covert action framework, such
as a wider range of covered activities and the ability to avoid the boundary
problems arising from the similarity between cyberattacks and cyberexploi-
tations. This Section next argues that the covert action framework provides a
single regime under which any appropriate U.S. agency or department could
conduct cyberattacks under one set of legal rules. The covert action regime's
considerable flexibility also tracks the emerging convergence of military and
intelligence functions in twenty-first-century warfare. Finally, this Section
addresses the important "traditional military activities" exception to the cov-
ert action requirements and the analytical challenge it poses in the case of
cyberattacks.
The covert action framework offers advantages over those of the military
framework when it comes to cyberattacks. At the most basic level, covert
action captures a range of activities that the military framework does not.
For example, suppose that the government thought it was necessary to alter
data in a foreign bank that it believed was being used by a terrorist group.
The military could not plausibly construe this action as preparation of any
battlefield, and (depending on the bank's location) the bank would be un-
likely to be the target of future armed conflict.60 Indeed, even when there is
potential for a future armed conflict, some activities not targeted directly at
the state's apparatus may be initiated as covert actions even if the target
could be legitimately struck by the military in wartime. For example, some
have alleged that in 1982, the United States doctored software that con-
trolled the pumps and valves of a Soviet natural gas pipeline, causing an
57. Some scholars have discussed the need for a doctrine of cyberneutrality, since many
malicious activities in cyberspace travel through countries with no connection to the attackers.
See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 268-69.
58. Or even something more serious, like a power grid.
59. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 141 (noting that the difficulty of attribution
means cyberattacks can often be carried out with a high level of deniability).
60. See WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, EXECUTIVE SECRETS 88 (2004).
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explosion.6 Aside from these more sensational possibilities, there are many
gradations of alteration or disruption of computer programs or networks
abroad. Very few of these would involve military purposes, but all would be
cyberattacks, and their indirect effects would be difficult to predict.
6 2
There are reasons beyond the statute's broader range of covered activi-
ties to prefer the covert action statute to military legal authority. One
significant consideration is the technical similarity between cyberattacks and
cyberexploitations. Because these two types of cyberoperations are distin-
guished primarily by the intent of the actor,63 prudence might suggest that
the covert action statute is a stronger basis on which to initiate cyberexploi-
tations, which could evolve rapidly into cyberattacks. The unpredictable
effects of operations over a computer network mean that what starts as espi-
onage conducted by the intelligence apparatus can transform into an activity
that changes the targeted program or network.6 Therefore, the agencies that
conduct cyberexploitations would benefit from the greater latitude to con-
duct cyberattacks that comes with the covert action regime, and use of the
covert action regime would also cause agency personnel to err on the side of
reporting their activities to the congressional committees.
The covert action statute is a flexible regime for operations that lie at the
border separating military from intelligence activities. This is so because it
provides a single framework that can be used by any agency,65 and such broad
use is well suited to the emerging reality of increased convergence of military
and intelligence functions. The definition of covert action is "act-based, not
actor-based."66 Indeed, the covert action framework can be employed even
61. NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 195. According to former national security official
Thomas Reed, American intelligence learned of Soviet plans to steal Canadian software to
automate operations at a trans-Siberian oil pipeline. U.S. intelligence modified the software in
advance of its theft, and several months after installation, the stolen codes caused pump speeds
and valves to induce more pressure than the pipeline could take, causing a massive explosion.
THOMAS C. REED, AT THE ABYSS: AN INSIDER'S HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 267-69 (2004).
Importantly, this action, if true, took place before the statutory reporting requirement was
implemented.
62. See supra note 53.
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
64. See Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collec-
tion, and Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 1199-2000 (2011).
65. Though covert actions are generally carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA"), the statute's language applies to any agency tasked with carrying out the activity. See
50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(3) (2006). There is an executive order stating that only the CIA (or the
military in a time of war declared by Congress) will conduct "special activities," but also that
the president may designate another agency to do so if it is appropriate to the mission. Exec.
Order No. 12,333, § 1.8(e), 3 C.F.R. 200, 206 (1982), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 note at 542, 545 (2006). In the case of cyberattack, the National Security Agency
("NSA") may often be the best fit. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 8, at 37 (calling NSA
"the world's premier electronic intelligence organization").
66. BAKER, supra note 24, at 151. Though Judge Baker admits that the numerous ex-
ceptions in the statute put pressure on this claim, see id. at 151-57, it is abundantly clear from
the language of the statute itself, see 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e), and from the statute's sanctioning
of covert actions by other agencies and departments, see id. § 413b(a)(3).
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when military authority is equally available. For example, even though
Osama bin Laden was clearly within the scope of a congressional authoriza-
tion to use force,67 U.S. policymakers decided to carry out a kill mission
under the covert action framework.68 Moreover, ater the success of the mis-
sion, the United States clearly made no effort to conceal its own role. Had
the operation failed though, the covert action framework would have offered
deniability, as opposed to merely secrecy. Thus, an operation under military
legal authority can also be conducted in secret under the covert action
framework. Also, by ensuring prior notification to members of Congress, the
covert action framework means members would know of a high-risk deci-
sion and could express a (nonbinding) view that might inform the
decisionmaking.69 In the case of the bin Laden mission, congressional noti-
fication was a politically astute move, regardless of whether the committee
members actually expressed substantive thoughts on the operation; the noti-
fication gave President Obama a means to try to diffuse blame for a failed
mission by noting knowledge (and perhaps tacit approval) of the plan on the
part of members of Congress. It also allowed the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy ("CIA"), an agency with a great deal of covert action experience, to take
the operational lead.7"
The covert action framework is not a panacea for all of the difficulties of
applying military authorities to cyberattacks, however. For one thing, a cov-
ert action that constitutes a use of force must comply with the law of armed
conflict, regardless of whether U.S. military or civilian personnel carry it
out.71 Indeed, the covert action statute itself lays out some important limita-
tions. Most broadly, no covert action can be conducted that "would violate
the Constitution or laws of the United States."72
There is a view that a broad range of deniable cyberattacks may be car-
ried out by the military under the covert action statute's exception for
"traditional ... military activities or routine support to such activities[,]
'7 3
67. Robert Chesney, What If Anything Does UBL's Death Mean for the AUMF?,
LAWFARE (May 2, 2011, 1:22 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/05/what-if-anything-
does-ubl%E2%80%99s-death-mean-for-the-aumf/.
68. Robert Chesney, On the Legality of Killing UBL Even If He Was Unarmed (and On
the Title 50 Issue), LAWFARE (May 4, 2011, 11:15 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/201 1/
05/on-the-legality-of-killing-ubi-even-if-he-was-unarmed-and-on-the-tite-50-issue/ (stating
that then-CIA Director Leon Panetta had specifically acknowledged that the raid to kill bin
Laden was a title 50 operation). This highlights the possibility that even events that will later
be trumpeted publicly (rather than denied) can be carried out under the statute with its presi-
dential finding and congressional reporting requirements.
69. The importance of congressional involvement as a policy matter is discussed infra
Part III.
70. See Nicholas Schmidle, Getting bin Laden: Inside the Raid in Abbottabad, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 8, 2011, at 34, 38.
71. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 77
(1992).
72. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(5) (2006).
73. Id. § 413b(e)(2).
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thus evading the finding and reporting requirements.74 But taken to ex-
tremes, this perspective would render the covert action statute meaningless.
Admittedly, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
does recognize military authority to conduct cyberattacks75 and the Act's
legislative history reveals that Congress meant to affirm that some cyberat-
tacks can be traditional military activities carried out under the same regime
that governs kinetic capabilities.76 Further, the covert action statute's own
legislative history suggests that Congress meant to exclude from the report-
ing requirement activities that were carried out under a military commander
or that constituted routine support for a military operation, even if carried
out well in advance of anticipated hostilities.
77
However, the argument taken too far recognizes almost no limits on the
military's ability to conduct cyberattacks (or many other military operations)
free of legislative oversight. In the case of an acknowledged conflict, even if
the operation itself is secret, there is indeed a strong basis for claiming the
exception. Presumably, in that scenario, either Congress has authorized the
hostilities in general, or the president is exercising his constitutional power
to defend the nation from attack. 7' But it is not plausible to suggest that rou-
tine support for anticipated hostilities (which would fall into the exception)
includes penetration of foreign networks that begins years, if not decades,
before hostilities.79 That interpretation is undesirable because it could entire-
ly prevent members of Congress from being informed of ongoing
cyberattacks by the United States.8° Cyberattacks' potential for massive in-
direct effects that cannot be reliably estimated ex ante makes this a more
serious problem than many other secret military operations might pose. The
perspective of even a few members of Congress might go far in increasing
74. See, e.g., Paul A. Walker, Traditional Military Activities in Cyberspace: Preparing
for "Netwar", 22 FLA. J. INT'L L. 333, 335-45 (2010).
75. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011) (codified as note to 10 U.S.C. § Ill (Supp. V 2011)).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 112-329, at 686 (2011) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2011
U.S.C.C.A.N. 963, 1076.
77. See RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33715, COVERT ACTION:
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE POLICY QUESTIONS 7-8 (2011); Walker, supra note
74, at 340-41.
78. For more on the importance of authorizations to use force, and their relationship to
this Note's argument, see supra Part II. A military cyberattack meant to disrupt the planning of
attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, which could easily be framed as falling within the congressional
authorization to use force in Iraq, Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Reso-
lution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (codified as note to 50 U.S.C. § 1541
(2006)), apparently disrupted more than 300 servers in Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Texas,
Ellen Nakashima, Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Web Site Illustrates Need for Clearer Cyberwar
Policies, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2010, at Al. Those are the type of potential consequences that
would have made congressional notification under title 50 desirable.
79. This type of long-term planning has precedent in kinetic warfare. See Walker, supra
note 74, at 342-43.
80. Id. at 335. Reasonable persons can differ, however, on the wisdom of this interpre-
tation as a matter of policy. See id. at 335 n.13.
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the amount of consideration that would precede such operations."s More
importantly, as a matter of statutory interpretation, reading the finding and
reporting requirements into oblivion in cases of preparation far in advance
of conflict seems to fly in the face of the animating purpose of a statute en-
acted in the wake of executive excess.82
The covert action statute enables the military, the CIA, the National Se-
curity Agency ("NSA"), and any other entity that may plausibly conduct
cyberattacks targeted abroad to do so pursuant to the same legal framework
of findings and reporting requirements. This unity of legal authority will be
useful as the lines between intelligence and military functions continue to
blur. 3 The covert action statute serves as a cautious choice when it is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether a cyberattack is a use of force or not, or a
traditional military activity or not. If a particular cyberattack that was meant
to be deniable is not considered a traditional military activity or within the
scope of the military's mission, failing to comply with the title 50 require-
ments would be a statutory violation by the executive. Meeting the threat of
terrorist organizations, individuals, or other targets (whether in the physical
world or cyberspace) whose locations may prevent traditional kinetic strikes
may call for more than can be delivered with cyberexploitations, and less
than what the military could do in a recognized conflict.
II. THE COVERT ACTION STATUTE AS AN INDEPENDENT
DOMESTIC LEGAL BASIS FOR USE OF FORCE
If a cyberattack rising to the level of a use of force is carried out
against a target not covered by a congressional authorization to use force,
the covert action statute would endow the president with greater constitu-
tional legitimacy in ordering the attack than would independent
presidential authority alone. To support this claim, Section II.A provides
an overview of separation of powers doctrine generally and constitutional
81. See Jack Goldsmith, Fire When Ready, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 19, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire-when-ready (noting that members of
intelligence committees have many ways to push back against proposed covert actions they do
not like).
82. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, The al-Aulaqi Strike and Military-Intelligence
Convergence, LAWFARE (Oct. 2, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/the-al-
aulaqi-strike-and-military-intelligence-convergence/ (noting in reference to drone strikes in
Yemen the close cooperation of the military and CIA and the merging of their technical
capacities, as well as the questions convergence raises for the respective legal regimes
governing intelligence and the military); see also Josh Gerstein, Sept. 11 Panel's Forgotten
Concern: 'Paramilitary' CIA, POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2011, 2:54 PM), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0911/63155.html (noting that the Obama Administration has increased the scope of
the CIA's paramilitary operations program). In another sign of this phenomenon, the director of
the National Security Agency is "dual hatted" as the commander of the U.S. military's Cyber
Command. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 8, at 39. Moreover, consider Secretary Panetta's
move from the CIA to his present post at the Department of Defense, and General Petraeus's
contemporaneous switch to head of the CIA. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence,
supra note 11, at 579.
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war powers in particular. Next, Section II.B argues that the covert action
statute can plausibly be read to provide congressional support for certain
uses of force, based on its text and the executive's history of interpreting
statutes originally meant to limit executive authority as affirmations of pres-
idential power. In addition, the textual limits in the covert action statute are
consistent with those necessary for Congress to delegate to the president
certain powers.
A. Separation of Powers and Constitutional War Powers
It has become axiomatic of American constitutional doctrine that presi-
dential decisions gain greater constitutional legitimacy when they are
carried out with Congress's approval. Though the president has tremendous
freedom to act autonomously when conducting foreign affairs, the concerted
action of both elected branches strengthens the presumption that the presi-
dential policy is lawful. It is unclear, however, what the respective powers of
either branch are when the president and Congress actively oppose one an-
other, or when the president acts in the face of congressional silence.84 In the
exercise of constitutional war powers, it seems clear that the president can
order the responsive use of force, but becomes less so when faced with the
question of whether the president may initiate an armed conflict. Congress
is probably empowered to place substantive limits on the scope of hostilities
and the initiation of conflicts.
Perhaps the best-known statement of the approach for assessing the rela-
tive power of the executive comes from the Supreme Court's decision in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.85 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Jackson established a famous, if enigmatic, framework for resolving separa-
tion of powers questions. Jackson divided the world of presidential action
into three categories. In the first (typically referred to as "Category I"), "the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
[and] his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." 86 In this scenario, the
president acts essentially with the total power of the federal government,
and presidential decisions will be supported by the strongest presumptions
of constitutional validity.87 In the next category ("Category II"), Jackson
states cryptically that when the president acts in the face of congressional
silence, there exists a "zone of twilight," in which the president can only
rely on his inherent constitutional powers for authority, and the powers of
the president and Congress may be concurrent.88 Finally, there is a third
sphere ("Category III"), in which the president's actions contradict the will
of Congress. In this third sphere, the president's power is at its "lowest ebb,"
84. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
85. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
86. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 635-37.
88. id. at 637.
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and can only be proper if the president's constitutional authority under the
circumstances outweighs that of Congress.89 Such a collision requires care-
ful scrutiny so as not to upset the balance of powers within constitutional
system.9" The Court has adopted Jackson's framework as controlling.9
Applying this general scheme to war powers is especially difficult be-
cause of the uncertainty surrounding the constitutional division of those
powers.92 The Constitution's text itself provides few clear answers. The
president is notably made commander-in-chief of the military, without ex-
planation of what that title means.93 The president is also vested, again
without clear definition, with "the executive Power."94 However, Congress is
also given grants of authority in war, including the power to declare war
9 5
provide for the raising of armies and navies,96 make rules to govern the mili-
tary,97 and "provide for the common [defense]."9
Scholars seeking to ascertain the Framers' original intent for those
clauses and the provisions' original meanings have generally concluded
that the president and Congress share warmaking powers, and that con-
gressional authorization is needed to initiate a war. None of the Framers
"wanted either to deny the [p]resident the power to respond to surprise
attack or to give the [p]resident general power to initiate hostilities."99
Several early Supreme Court cases interpreting the constitutional text
seem to confirm this, and they assign Congress the primary role in decid-
ing when to enter war. °00 As for the meaning of the Commander-in-Chief
Clause, it is clear that it was not merely honorific, but rather implied some
substantive authority as well. 10 At the very least, Congress may not delegate
command of the armed forces to anyone other than the president, who will be
the person to direct military activities as authorized by Congress.'012 While the
89. Id. at 637-38.
90. Id.
91. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 672-78 (1981) (discussing
and applying Jackson's framework).
92. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U.
CHI. L. REv. 377, 377-78 (2011) (book review).
93. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1.
94. Id. § 1,cl. 1.
95. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
96. Id. cls. 12-13.
97. Id. cl. 14.
98. Id. cl. 1.
99. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1973).
100. E.g., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1,28 (1801) (stating that the Constitution
vests the warmaking power in Congress and that Congress may authorize hostilities); see also
Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief and the Separation of Powers After
Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933,935-36 (2007).
101. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REv. 689,
767 (2008).
102. See id. at 767-68; see also SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 99, at 5-6.
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Commander-in-Chief Clause does seem to imbue the president with some
inviolable powers to direct the military, history suggests that the power to
command was not an unlimited power to use the military when and as the
president saw fit. 103
On questions of executive power, practice and tradition are also im-
portant interpretive tools,10" and the history of executive practice indicates
that while presidents have often taken an expansive view of their substantive
warmaking powers, Congress has also played a significant role in cabining
presidents' authority to initiate certain conflicts and in defining actions that
a president may take in war. "Deeply embedded traditional ways of conduct-
ing government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give
meaning to the words of a text or supply them."105 When looking for the
contours of the executive power with which the Constitution vests the presi-
dent, it is relevant to look to long, unbroken traditions of presidential
practices that have never been challenged by Congress. 106 In the case of
warmaking, the relevant history shows that "[p]residents have long operat-
ed" under the assumption that their conduct in war was subject to some
degree of congressional control, "and ... have adjusted their actions" in
response to such control.0 7 Thus, the view that presidents' commander-in-
chief power established a monopoly over the use of force preclusive of
congressional control is mistaken." 8
103. Barron & Lederman, supra note 101, at 800. There is a minority view that the
Commander-in-Chief Clause granted a preclusive substantive power to authorize hostilities
to the president, and that Congress's power to declare war meant nothing other than the
power to recognize the legal status of war. See, e.g., JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE 144-52 (2005). However, Professor Yoo's position has been sharply criticized. See,
e.g., Mortenson, supra note 92, at 393-97. Professor Mortenson argues that "Yoo's discus-
sion of the Founding is thoroughly unconvincing on any of the national security questions that
matter." Id. at 397.
104. See SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 99, at 13 ("[W]hat the Constitution 'really' meant
... in practice.., only [actual] practice could disclose."); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 6-7), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1999516.
105. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
106. Id. at 610-11; see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTI-
TUTION 70-71 (1990) (describing the importance of precedential actions in determining
"quasi-constitutional custom" in national security affairs). Importantly, while Justice Frankfur-
ter's opinion is often seen as a gloss on situations in which the president acts and Congress is
silent, and Barron & Lederman, infra note 107, discuss the history of the clash of presidential
and congressional will, both emphasize the importance of history and tradition in addressing
questions of the relative powers of the elected branches.
107. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARv. L. REV. 941, 1101 (2008).
108. Id. at 1100. Again, Yoo has a different perspective. See Yoo, supra note 103, at
155-60 (arguing that recent history comports with a view of nearly unfettered executive power
in war, and that Congress's only recourses involve defunding operations or impeachment).
But, for a rebuttal of other claims along similar lines, see Mortenson, supra note 92, at 425-
30.
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Constitutional text and history, executive practice, and scholarly com-
mentary seem to establish that some role for Congress is necessary when the
president initiates hostilities."1 ° Even the Office of Legal Counsel, which
because of its institutional position can be expected to assert a broad view of
executive power,1 0 has recognized Congress's authority to put a sixty-day
limit on presidential deployment of troops into hostilities, to require consul-
tation when the president does order entry into hostilities, and even to order
the withdrawal of troops via legislation.III As for those deployments that are
authorized, Congress need not directly issue a declaration of war using those
precise words. Rather, it seems that Congress has more flexibility to choose
the language authorizing force.12 The next Section questions whether the
covert action statute might qualify as such an authorization in certain cir-
cumstances.
B. Cyberattacks, Force, and Covert Action
This Section applies the separation of powers and war powers analysis
to cyberattacks. Section II.B. 1 argues that inftiating cyberattacks that are not
a use of force under the covert action statute can elevate the operation to
Youngstown Category I, where it would enjoy the greatest presumption of
constitutional legitimacy. If a cyberattack would be a use of force--or more
likely, if it is unclear whether it would approximate a use of force-and the
attack would not be in support of an ongoing conflict already authorized by
Congress, then the cyberattack would trigger the war powers requirements,
and congressional approval would be needed.1 3 Section II.B.2 contends that
the covert action statute might conceivably meet the requirement for con-
gressional authorization for those cyberattacks that do necessitate a war
powers analysis. This is because of the statute's text, the executive practice
of interpreting statutes as affirmations of executive power, and the claim's
consistency with limits on congressional delegations of power to the presi-
dent.
109. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
110. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 34-35 (2009).
111. Presidential Power to Use Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization,
4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 186, 195-96 (1980). But see Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Haiti,
28 Op. O.L.C., 2004 WL 5743904, at *5 (Mar. 17, 2004) (declining to decide the constitution-
ality of the War Powers Resolution).
112. Doe v. Bush, 323 E3d 133, 144 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that the Iraq War Resolution
is by its terms an authorization for the president to use military force); see also Curtis A. Brad-
ley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2047, 2057-62 (2005).
113. Even if the "congressionalist" view of war powers articulated in supra Section II.A
is incorrect, presidential decisions to go to war in the absence of congressional support would
still be in Youngstown Category II, and those decisions would have a firmer constitutional
foothold if made pursuant to some congressional authorization, which might include, as I
argue, the covert action statute.
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1. Cyberattacks, Youngstown, and War Powers
Depending on the type of cyberattack and the legal framework applied,
the action might fall into any of Justice Jackson's Youngstown categories,
but in many circumstances, compliance with the covert action statute will
elevate the operation into Category I. Given the broad statutory definition of
covert action,"14 it seems that any cyberattack that does not fall into one of
the covert action statute's exceptions" 5 and is meant to be deniable would
trigger the statute's finding and reporting requirements. The statute states
that the president "may not authorize the conduct of a covert action" without
meeting the necessary requirements." 6 A president who ordered an attack
without following the finding and reporting procedures would therefore be
in Category III, where presidential authority is at its lowest. Conversely,
complying with the covert action statute's requirements would place the
operation in a higher Youngstown category than would using the military
framework.
As for those cyberattacks that do generate sufficient effects outside cy-
berspace to constitute a use of force and thus require a war powers
analysis-under which the president can rely on inherent executive power
for responsive force but must have congressional support to initiate offen-
sive conflict-surely some could be exempt from the definition of covert
action under the traditional military activities exception," 7 but that does not
resolve the separation of powers issue. If a cyberattack that approximated a
use of force were ordered without a statutory authorization to use force
against that entity, the operation would exceed the president's war powers!18
Relying on the covert action procedures, especially when it is unclear
whether a specific cyberattack would qualify as a traditional military activi-
ty, could ensure a stronger presumption of constitutional validity. No special
congressional authorization seems necessary for those cyberattacks-even
the ones that constitute a use of force-that are initiated in support of an
ongoing conflict already authorized by Congress. But outside this scenario,
cyberattacks that constitute a use of force require congressional approval
under the Constitution's division of war powers.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 speaks
specifically to cyberattacks, but it cannot be read convincingly as a general
authorization to conduct cyberattacks that would constitute force. The Act
states that "Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capa-
bility, and . .. may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace" subject to
114. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006).
115. See id. § 413b(e)(l)-(5).
116. ld. § 413b(a).
117. See id. § 413b(e)(2); see also supra notes 26, 73-77 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the arguments discussed at supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text suggest that this
may not always be the case, and that the covert action framework still exists as an available
option.
118. Again, even rejecting the view that Congress must assent to the initiation of use of
force, at best such an operation would be in Youngstown Category II.
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the "policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for
kinetic capabilities" and the War Powers Resolution. 19 On one reading,
this provision is a blanket authorization for cyberattacks. But that would
ignore both the full text of the statute and its legislative history. The statute
specifically notes that the authority is subject to the legal regimes that govern
kinetic operations. 20 This language seems to disclaim any pretense of altering
the substantive legal regime that would apply to the operation. Moreover, the
legislative history makes clear that the purpose of the bill was to confirm that
notwithstanding their novelty, cyberattacks can indeed qualify as traditional
military activities.12' The section of the statute dealing with cyberattacks is
likely premised on the assumption of some preexisting authorization to use
force, as opposed to a new grant of authority. 22 A better reading, then, is that
the statute merely resolves any confusion over whether the military can con-
duct cyberattacks at all. This Note assumes it can, but one must look
elsewhere for a plausible candidate for congressional authorization to con-
duct cyberattacks that amount to a use of force.
2. The Covert Action Statute as Authorization to Use Force
The requirement for congressional authorization under a war powers
analysis would be met if the covert action statute itself could sometimes func-
tion as a limited authorization to use force. This question has not been
extensively explored in the academic literature. The suggestion that the covert
action statute might provide such an independent domestic legal basis to use
force appears to have been suggested first by Martin Lederman, professor of
law at Georgetown University Law Center, writing on a legal blog. 23 Discuss-
ing the possible domestic legal bases for the operation that killed Osama bin
Laden, Lederman briefly mentioned covert action. While bin Laden was
indeed covered by an existing authorization to use military force, the cov-
ert action statute "might have been a second source of domestic
119. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011) (codified as note to 10 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. V 2011)).
120. Id.
121. H.R. REP. No. 112-329, at 686 (2011) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2011
U.S.C.C.A.N. 963, 1076. This view is consistent with a provision in an earlier version of the
legislation that authorizes the military to conduct cyberattacks pursuant to the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force of September 2001, or in response to an attack on an asset of the
Department of the Defense, rather than a general authorization to use force so long as it is in
cyberspace. See H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 962 (as passed by House, May 26, 2011). It is simi-
larly consistent with language that would amend the provision in the pending National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. See H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. § 941 (as passed
by House, May 18, 2012).
122. See Chesney, Offensive Cyberspace Operations, supra note 38.
123. Marty Lederman, The U.S. Perspective on the Legal Basis for the bin Laden Opera-




authority."'124 That is the full extent of the suggestion. On another blog,
Robert Chesney, professor of law at the University of Texas School of Law,
responded, saying that surely some activities that might be undertaken pur-
suant to the covert action statute are "of sufficient intensity that they would
demand a war powers analysis if conducted openly."'125 Chesney wondered
whether that analysis can be avoided entirely by making the decision to pro-
ceed under the covert action framework as an initial matter.
26
Based on the text of the statute, it seems that a decision to proceed under
the finding and reporting requirements places a cyberattack that constitutes a
use of force on considerably firmer constitutional ground than one that relies
solely on the president's inherent authority. The language of the statutory
text itself should be given considerable weight in interpretation. 127 In this
case, the statute defines covert actions as "activities" of the U.S. government
meant "to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad"
where the hand of the United States "will not be apparent or acknowl-
edged." 2 8 That language is very broad, and that breadth should inform the
analysis. Force is not mentioned, but neither is it precluded. As long as the
president complies with the conditions in the statute, it is reasonable to un-
derstand the statute as conferring congressional approval on covert actions.
A serious objection to this contention is that by excluding traditional
military activities from the definition of covert action, the covert action stat-
ute does preclude its application to the use of force. However, this Section's
argument is based on the contention that the universe of traditional military
activities does not exhaust the universe of operations that involve sufficient
force to trigger a war powers analysis. The difficulty is in discerning an ana-
lytically sound line to distinguish the two spheres. Some observers have
argued that the technological novelty of cyberattacks cannot bar them from
being traditional military activities, for the simple reason that the U.S. mili-
tary has always been on the cutting edge of technology.'29 This view is
certainly correct insofar as cyberattacks can be traditional military activities,
but it does not follow that technological novelty does no analytical work
124. Id. At least in its public statements, the CIA--the agency most associated with
covert action-does not appear to claim the covert action statute as an authorization to use
force. See Stephen W. Preston, CIA and the Rule of Law, 6 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 1,
6 (2012) (noting that use of force requires either inherent executive authority or specific con-
gressional authorization).
125. Robert Chesney, Title 50 as a Sufficient Domestic Law Predicate for Certain Uses
of Force, LAWFARE (May 24, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/05/title-50-
as-a-sufficient-domestic-law-predicate-for-certain-uses-of-force/.
126. Id.
127. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63-65 (1994) (highlighting the importance of giving primary
weight to statutory text and the purposes that method serves).
128. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006).
129. See, e.g., Steven G. Bradbury, The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and
Offensive Cyber Operations, 2 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 591, 605 (2011), available at
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02Vol.-2_Bradbury-Final 1 .pdf.
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under any circumstances. It seems that combining the characteristic features
of cyberattacks-difficulty of attribution, remote access, and unpredictable
effects-with a view of the traditional military activities exception that
would include all uses of force would categorically exempt those cyberat-
tacks that entail force from even the legislative oversight offered by the War
Powers Resolution. 30 Specifically, though recent statutory enactments con-
firm that cyberattacks undertaken by the military must comply with the War
Powers Resolution, 31 the Obama Administration's narrow reading of the
resolution's reference to "hostilities"' 132 makes it difficult to conceive of a
cyberattack that would trigger the resolution's reporting requirements.
133
The fact that a particular view of the exception might allow a result so at
odds with the resolution's purpose undercuts its theoretical soundness.
Concern for statutory purpose leads to another plausible objection to this
position: the covert action statute was meant to restrain executive power rather
than enhance it. The covert action statute was enacted after the Iran-Contra
affair as a means of providing oversight to check the president's discretion in
ordering covert activities to meet foreign policy objectives. 134 That back-
ground should arguably guard against an effort to transform the statute into a
grant of authority. 135
But that objection ignores a long history of executive responses to
statutes that seek to define presidential power. The executive branch has a
long-standing tradition of construing statutory definitions and limitations on
presidential power as affirmations of authority. 36 Perverse though that logic
may seem, it maps well onto the widely acknowledged constitutional
significance that executive practice has when analyzing separation of powers
questions. 137 One salient example is the War Powers Resolution, whose
limitations have already been read so as not to apply to a wide range of
activities. 38 The executive branch has interpreted the resolution, passed in
the flurry of efforts to control executive power after Watergate and Vietnam,
as a confirmation of the president's power to use the military in hostilities
without specific statutory authorization.'39 Reading the limits imposed by
the covert action statute as an affirmation, if not a grant of power, provided
that the proper procedures are followed, would not be a dissimilar exercise.
Moreover, because the broad language used to define covert action seems to
130. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1448.
131. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011) (codified as note to 10 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. V 2011)).
132. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
133. See Chesney, Offensive Cyberspace Operations, supra note 38.
134. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
135. But see Easterbrook, supra note 127.
136. See KOH, supra note 106, at 117.
137. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.




invite such a construction, it is not nearly as objectionable as a strained
interpretation of the War Powers Resolution that twists the term "hostilities"
almost beyond recognition.
Whether the covert action statute can serve as a congressional authoriza-
tion for the president to use at least some force is partly dependent on
whether it is appropriate for Congress to delegate such authority in such a
broadly worded statute. Congress may delegate its authority to another actor
so long as the delegation includes some "intelligible principle" to which the
actor must conform. 140 So long as "Congress clearly delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of th[e]
delegated authority," the delegation is constitutionally valid. ' In the case of
the covert action statute, Congress has placed the authority in the president,
prescribed special procedures that must be followed, and specified that the
president may not order the actions unless in support of a clear foreign poli-
cy objective. This satisfies the delegation test. Moreover, the delegation
doctrine may have even less applicability in the case of war powers, where
the powers of Congress and the president overlap; there is not merely a del-
egation but also an affirmation of existing authority.' Thus, there is more
force to the suggestion that the covert action statute may provide a domestic
legal basis for cyberattacks--even those that amount to a use of force-that
includes both presidential and statutory support.
Though separation of powers analysis is normally applied as a tool for
judicial scrutiny, whether a major cyberattack can be said to have been con-
ducted with the blessing of both Congress and the president is of serious
constitutional import. The fact that activities may not be subject to judicial
review 143 makes it even more important that the two other major constitu-
tional actors in the American system conduct themselves with their
constitutional obligations in mind. Also, a careful understanding of how the
separation of powers applies to a novel means of statecraft and warfare can
contribute to the public understanding of the national constitutional ethos.14
A cyberattack's massive potential for unintended consequences demands a
cautious constitutional approach to the conduct. The covert action statute
140. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 372-73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in the field of foreign affairs, there may be no limit
on the powers Congress can delegate to the president. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22 (1936).
142. See Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 143 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting the lesser applicability
of the delegation doctrine to foreign policy questions).
143. A suit alleging noncompliance with the covert action statute would most likely be
dismissed for nonjusticiability. As of a September 19, 2012 Westlaw search, only two cases
have even cited the covert action statute, and neither decided whether an action complied with
the statutory requirements. See In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F.
Supp. 2d 1109, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2008); ACLU v. Dep't of Defense, 396 . Supp. 2d 459, 462
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
144. Cf Barron & Lederman, supra note 107, at 1101 (describing a similar benefit of
understanding the history of legislative constraint of executive power).
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serves this function by enabling the president to act with congressional ap-
proval.
III. ENACTING THE COVERT ACTION REGIME AS PRESUMPTIVE
VIA EXECUTIVE ORDER
Cyberattacks present a challenge for U.S. policymakers: they are diffi-
cult to locate within a clear legal category and there is a significant risk of
uncontrollable consequences associated with their use. As a result, policy-
makers must choose a paradigm to govern their use that will ensure that the
executive branch is held accountable and shares information with legisla-
tors.
This Part argues that the federal government should adopt the presump-
tion that cyberattacks will be carried out under the covert action statute, and
that the best way forward is for the president to issue an executive order
making the covert action regime the presumptive framework for cyberat-
tacks. It includes a brief discussion of why a president might willingly
constrain her discretion by issuing the proposed executive order. It also
shows that while the internal executive processes associated with both mili-
tary and intelligence legal frameworks help mitigate the risk of
cyberattacks' misuse by the executive, only the covert action regime pro-
vides an adequate role for Congress. Finally, this Part argues that the
executive order option is preferable to one alternative proposed by schol-
ars-enacting legislation-because of the practical difficulties of passing
new legislation.
The covert action regime is the best approach for committing cyberat-
tacks under the current law, as it would facilitate cooperation among
executive agencies. The debate over which agency and set of legal authori-
ties govern cyberattacks has caused no small amount of confusion.145
Apparently, an Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") memorandum declined to
decide which legal regime should govern the use of cyberattacks, and the
uncertainty has led to interagency squabbles, as well as confusion over how
cyberattacks are to be regulated.146 Establishing a presumptive answer would
go far toward resolving this dispute.
Most importantly, adopting the covert action framework as the presump-
tive legal regime would be a principled way to help ensure constitutional
legitimacy when the president orders a cyberattack. 147 There is also reason to
believe that presidential power is intimately bound up in credibility, which in
turn is largely dependent on the perception of presidential compliance with
applicable domestic law.148 A practice of complying with the covert action
145. See Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Is Debating Cyber-Attacks, WASH. POsT, Nov. 6,
2010, at A01.
146. See id.
147. See generally supra Section II.B.




regime for cyberattacks, both when they do not constitute a use of force and
when it is unclear whether they do, is most likely to be in compliance with
the law. Compliance with the covert action regime would also encourage
covert action procedures in close cases without unduly restricting the execu-
tive's choice to use military authorities in appropriate circumstances.
The executive might also issue the proposed order, even though it would
limit her freedom in some ways, because of the possible benefits of con-
straining future administrations or preempting legislative intervention. 49 For
example, in this context, an administration may choose to follow the finding
and reporting requirements in order to convince Congress that legislative
intervention is unnecessary for proper oversight. This is acceptable if the
covert action regime is in fact adequate on its own. Moreover, if greater
statutory control over cyberattacks is needed, the information shared with
Congress may give Congress the tools and knowledge of the issue necessary
to craft related legislation. 150 Additionally, while executive orders are hardly
binding, the inertia following adoption of an order may help constrain future
administrations, which may be more or less trustworthy than the current
one. Creating a presumption through an executive order also establishes a
stable legal framework for cyberattacks that allows law to follow policy in
this new field, and permits decisionmakers to learn more about the nature of
cyberoperations before passing detailed statutes that may result in unintend-
ed consequences.
A presumption in favor of the title 50 regime for cyberattacks is also de-
sirable because it comports with the reality of an executive constrained by
its own internal processes. Though energy, dispatch, and secrecy are among
the key advantages the executive possesses over Congress, 151 the existence
of a professional bureaucratic corps, including many lawyers, within the
executive branch can foster necessary deliberation about important policy
decisions. 152 For issues on which there is disagreement among executive
agencies, such as a potential turf war between the military and intelligence
communities over control of cyberattacks, advisory and adjudicatory bodies
such as the Office of Legal Counsel can play a constructive role. 53 Even on
an issue such as the best legal regime to govern cyberattacks, which is es-
149. See Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in
National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 895-96 (2011).
150. See Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Im-
proving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1090 (2008).
151. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
152. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006).
153. See Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REv. 1688, 1713-23
(2011) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010)) (defending the institutional value of OLC). Bruce Ackerman, whose book Professor
Morrison was reviewing, responded with a less optimistic view of the OLC's value as a tool to
cabin executive discretion. See Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside the Beltway: A Reply to Profes-
sor Morrison, 124 HARv. L. REv. FORUM 13, 15-22 (2011), http:l/www.
harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124forum-ackerman.pdf.
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sentially a policy choice, the friction between different competing agencies
itself can serve a checking function.'54
Moreover, the covert action statute helps with the vital work of balanc-
ing the president's need for independence against the costs of an uninformed
Congress, 5' especially on national security issues with such potential for
unforeseeable diplomatic and military risks. The national interests at stake
in the cyberattack context are too great to be left to the president alone. 6
Some scholars have proposed a contrary view. On this view, the speed
with which cyberspace events can play out makes it important for the legis-
lative role to be clearly established via statutory reform in advance of any
cyberattack by the United States.'57 Thus, proposals for extensive legislative
intervention would help ensure Congress's appropriate role in deciding
whether or not to go to war. 58 The notion of congressional participation is
well in line with the view of shared constitutional war powers articulated
earlier in this Note. 59 Moreover, congressional participation comports with
an ideal of government decisionmaking where the branch most immediately
accountable to voters has been given a chance to express its view. Discuss-
ing the covert action regime, Stephen Dycus, professor of law at Vermont
Law School, expresses concern that only the smaller group of intelligence
committee leaders and the leaders of each House will be informed, and that
in general the reporting requirements do not ensure that Congress will ob-
tain the information it needs to play a meaningful role in the discussion.
6
1
Additionally, there are concerns regarding the traditional military activities
exception to the reporting requirements in the covert action statute.'16 Spe-
cifically, the worry is that the military might classify clandestine
cyberwarfare activities as "operational preparation of the environment" and
thereby skirt the reporting requirements, being accountable instead to the
congressional armed services committees-which could create confusion.
62
Dycus's proposed legislative reforms include designating particular con-
gressional committees to receive reports, forming a lead federal agency for
cybersecurity, banning automated offensive responsive to a cyberattack, and
crafting procedures to aid private networks that come under attack.
163
However, this position is flawed because it dismisses the covert action
statute as wholly inadequate to protecting the value of congressional partici-
pation, and gives short shrift to the non-warlike dimensions of many
154. See Katyal, supra note 152.
155. Kitrosser, supra note 150, at 1089.
156. See, e.g., Stephen Dycus, Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY
L. & POL'Y 155, 158 (2010).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 171.
159. See supra Part II.
160. Dycus, supra note 156, at 159-60.
161. See supra Section I.C.
162. Dycus, supra note 156, at 161.
163. Id. at 167-71.
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cyberattacks. The worry that motivates some of the proposals seems to ig-
nore the many examples of cyberattacks-such as manipulation of
electronic ballots in a foreign election or disseminating false information
through foreign networks to affect media reports-that, outside normal con-
texts, could not plausibly fall under the military activities exception.
Moreover, they underestimate the potential power of a presumption by the
executive in favor of the covert action regime.
An executive order establishing such a presumptive posture of reporting
could go a long way toward bringing Congress into the process. First, an
order establishing written findings and congressional reporting as the default
rule could cause momentum to settle around title 50 procedures for initiat-
ing cyberattacks. 164 Also, one scholar has argued that the most effective way
to ensure congressional notification might not be changing the actual rules
of who is to be notified and when, but rather implementing changes that
encourage the executive branch to comply with existing requirements.
165
Significantly more modest statutory interventions have also been pro-
posed; however, statutory clarification may not be necessary to achieve their
aims. Like Dycus, Robert Chesney is concerned about drawing lines be-
tween covert action and traditional military activity in the cyberattack
context. He argues that it may be useful for Congress to clarify that the mili-
tary may conduct those operations outside the title 50 framework when
defending Pentagon assets or acting pursuant to a separate statute authoriz-
ing force. 166 Moreover, he suggests notifying the congressional armed
services committees when such operations are likely to have effects that
spill over into areas outside a zone of conflict. 67 But there need not be a
legislative mandate for an executive practice of reporting cyberattacks to
both intelligence and armed services committees. Moreover, as Chesney
himself argues, under a proper understanding of the definitions in the covert
action statute, where routine support for ongoing hostilities is exempt under
the military activities exception, any cyberattack initiated in support of a
conflict authorized by congressional statute would be exempt. 168 This view
accords well with that articulated in this Note,1 69 and an executive order set-
ting covert action procedures as the default would hardly preclude forgoing
that framework in appropriate circumstances; a presumption, after all, mere-
ly encourages findings and reporting when there is doubt about the
appropriate framework.
164. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 8 (rev. & expanded ed. 2009)
(using behavioral law and economics to support the claim that the choice of a default rule has
a significant impact on outcomes); see also GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE
OF DECISION 151-52 (2d ed. 1999) (noting the role of bureaucratic politics in effecting out-
comes).
165. Kitrosser, supra note 150, at 1084.
166. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence, supra note 11, at 544.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 628.
169. See supra Part H (arguing that the legitimacy of executive decisions to use force is
enhanced by statutory support).
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Finally, while urging Congress to clarify the law governing cyberattacks
may be advisable, one should consider the reality that such legislation is
very difficult to pass. Congress is notoriously slow to act and legislation is
difficult to push through the arduous process to enactment. There are nu-
merous stages in the process at which a bill, even on an issue of significant
importance, can be stalled or killed. 70 For example, a bill may not be con-
sidered by its corresponding committee in either House, may be bogged
down with amendments that cause it to lose support, or be subject to the
Senate filibuster, among other "vetogates."'' In the case of clarifying the
appropriate procedures for conducting a cyberattack, there may be concern
that such legislation, either by imposing substantive constraints or reporting
requirements, will improperly burden the president on a national security
issue of increasing importance. Congress as an institution tends to acquiesce
to presidential prerogative in national security matters. 7 2 Further, given that
Congress has recently addressed cyberattacks in legislation, albeit in an un-
helpfully vague provision, 17 3 the possibility of expansive legislative
clarification in the near future seems even more remote.
An executive order making the covert action regime presumptive for
cyberattacks gives the executive branch considerable flexibility while also
ensuring notification to Congress. A presumptive regime helps remove cur-
rent confusion within the executive branch, as well as allows cyberattack
policy to develop with members of Congress gaining access to information
that may be helpful in crafting later statutory controls on the use of cyberat-
tacks. Moreover, some proposals for immediate legislative intervention
overestimate congressional will to legislate in this field and underestimate
the protections for interbranch collaboration offered by the covert action
regime.
CONCLUSION
The covert action framework is a flexible one that can be applied by any
appropriate agency, whether intelligence or military. The legal regimes gov-
erning military action, by contrast, lack this flexibility. Moreover, the wide
array of cyberattacks that are not of a warlike nature, along with potential
confusion between cyberattacks and cyberexploitations, counsels in favor of
the covert action framework. In limited circumstances, the covert action
170. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444 (2008).
171. Id. at 1444-47. Despite Congress's factfinding resources and the necessity of its
intervention in certain areas, legislative paralysis can often result in a gap in lawmaking initia-
tive that other bodies cannot fill. See Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who
Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792-94 (1963) (lamenting Con-
gress's failure to provide adequate guidance even in areas of the law that have become
creatures of statute). All legal writing should cite Judge Friendly somewhere.
172. KOH, supra note 106, at 123-33.
173. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011) (codified as note to 10 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. V 2011)).
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statute might serve as an alternative legal basis for certain uses of force, and
adherence to the covert action procedures could move cyberattacks into a
sphere of presidential authority entitled to a strong presumption of validity.
Finally, an executive order making the covert action framework presumptive
for cyberattacks is a more attainable goal than detailed legislation. Indeed,
the reporting requirements of the covert action regime may both preserve
accountability to Congress and enable legislative reform.
